This sample is provided for general guidance only.  It is a very simplified "reaction paper" to Petroski's book "To Engineer is Human."
It is acceptable and would be graded well into the "B" range according to my current standards in CSC 300 for a first assigned reaction paper (you'll write even better later!)  The main elements it must contain:

Rational arguments are made by taking known facts and applying general principles to them to arrive at conclusions.  Sometimes conclusions may be reached inductively or by experiment (statistical arguments).  

Strive to overcome the main weakness I find in CSC 300 papers: mere opinion or emotion masquerading as argument.  Your argument should be falsifiable, subject to verification.  Your feelings and opinions, while they are important to recognize, have nothing to do with rational analysis here (except to note them and correct for any bias :-) 

Sample Reaction Paper: To Engineer is Human by Petroski

By Matt Col—n and used by permission (modified by CST, Jan 2006.)

Facts

                        Throughout the history of engineering, failed or flawed projects and designs have many times lead to disastrous ends.  In Kansas City, the Hyatt Regency HotelÕs newly implemented skywalks fell because of a last minute decision to change the support design, killing 114 people and injuring almost 200 more in 19811.  The Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Washington for months after it was opened undulated during moderate winds, eventually twisting itself apart in 19402.  Several de Havilland Comet commercial jetsÕ pressurized cabin exploded during take-off and flight, one being destroyed on the first anniversary of jetliner service in 1953 and two more in 19543.  As a result of these failures being publicly known, steps were taken to find out what caused the failure and what would need to be done to fix these problems.  New measures were taken to fix similar existing structures, and from the knowledge gained from these failures, the Hyatt Regency Hotel replaced its skywalk design with a more stable single walkway4, other bridges similar to the Tacoma Narrows Bridge were retrofitted to increase their structural safety5, and the de Havilland Comet 4 was the first to start a trans-Atlantic jet passenger service6.

 

Issue

                         Do engineers learn more from failures than successes?

 

Arguments

    Yes, engineers learn more by failure than by success.

                        In the book, To Engineer is Human, Petroski makes the argument that innovative successes and structural soundness are products of the knowledge gained by failure.  He states that apparent success does not prove true success, for Òno matter how many examples of agreement one may collect, they do not prove the truth of the hypothesis, for it may be argued that one has not tested it in the single case where the theory may fail to agree with reality7.Ó  Thus only through failure can be know how to design one step closer to true success.  From his own life, he gives examples of progress through failure, such as the improvement of the Speak & Spell from using a keyboard with breakable buttons to using a buttonless keyboard8 and his endeavor with his son to create a slingshot9.
    No, engineers may learn enough from success to make progress.

                        From numerous behavior studies on animals and humans, behavior scientist Edward Lee Thorndike conversely believes that people can learn more by Òaccidental successÓ rather than failure.  He states in The Human Nature Club, ÒThe method of learning by the selection of successes from among a lot of acts is the most fundamental method of learning10.Ó  If applied to the engineering field, the most fundamental method of learning would be from the analysis of successful designs and structures and what was done that made them successful.  Too many factors can lead to failure; studying the few aspects that led to a design success will benefit the learning party more than studying the many causes for failure.

Analysis  (What is the answer and why is it so?)

Personal experience in failure leading to success

                        As a musician, I have learned that failure is the only way to progress; if anyone can pick up a violin and play like a concert master, no one would need to practice.  Practicing a piece of music is the repetition of failure, creeping closer and closer to success, and then attempting to repeat the success while minimizing the failures.  I remember the hours spent teaching my roaming bow to play only in a small section next to the bridge of my violin.  I remember how my sluggish left hand would accompany my impatient right hand on the piano.  Only after these hours would I have climbed the steps of failure to reach a level of success.  Does this pattern of making progress also apply to engineering?
Latent defects only found through experience

                        The de Havilland Comet design Òrelied on well-established methods essentially the same as those in general use by aircraft designers."11  It also had the unknown flaw of cabin windows developing cracks during use.  Engineers cannot design a "better' aircraft without an awareness of the potential flaw.  How could such a flaw ever become known?  Engineering models taught to generations of previous engineers failed to include the relevant parameters and relationships - there had been no reason to think about the possibility.  The dramatic failure and resulting deaths would give them the economic (and altruistic) motivation to study and obviate this sort of problem.   ÒThe experience with the Comets eventually improved the state of the art of aircraft design12.Ó  The new model of Comets, the Comet 4, was strengthened using the knowledge gained from its failed predecessors, increasing its lifetime from thirty thousand hours to over hundreds of thousands of hours13.   This is engineering progress!  Additionally, the first jet to start a trans-Atlantic service was a de Havilland Comet 4, clearly proving that ÒComet failure [had] turned into Comet success14.Ó
Engineers learn through refinement of models to include newly discovered phenomena

                        Talking with a friend of mine about learning from failure, he told me about progress for civil engineering education resulting from a single unexpected structural failure15.  A section of a warehouse roof collapsed at Wilkins Air Force Depot in Shelby, Ohio, in 1955, originating from a latent structural problem.  The warehouse roof was supported by reinforced concrete continuous frames, but the main longitudinal girders had little web reinforcement.  In response to this failure and distress problems in similar structures, revisions were made for the 1956 edition of the ACI Building Code, and research began on shear strength of reinforced concrete members.  In this way, the national organization of civil engineers began an inquiry to see if the single unexpected failure had larger implications for the state of the art for the field.  In 1973, the ASCE-ACI Committee 426 (Shear and Diagonal Tension) released ÒThe Shear Strength of Reinforced Concrete Members,Ó reviewing years of experimental data obtained on shear.  Committee 426 also said that, Òthe behavior of beams failing in shear was much better understood than the behavior of members such as columns, deep beams, and corbels, and that there was a need to develop realistic behavioral models for these members as well,Ó which could serve as a basis for Òthe future unification and simplification of design regulations.Ó  From a single failure, research began and experiments were done to improve the strength of reinforced concrete, a step towards progress that would not have begun without the surprising failure incident at the Wilkins Air Force Depot16.


Conclusion

                        Engineers learn important lessons from their failures.  While traveling on the road of success leads us slowly through predictable grounds, innovation takes us to where new problems are encountered.  New lessons may be learned from each branch of our path of innovation: lessons both joyful and painful.  In general, a failure places an obstruction in our path, telling us to go a different direction.  Only through meandering the labyrinth of failed designs can we detail the tradeoffs and make an informed decision.  We can jump back onto the trodden road of success, safe and failure free, or we can tradeoff the known qualities and pay attention to the unmodeled phenomena as it occurs.  In this way we can learn truly new things.  Being engineers, what path should we take?  As Robert Frost concurs, take the path less traveled; it will make all the difference.

Sources Cited by Number

 

  1. Petroski, Henry, To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (pp. 85 - 88), Vintage Books, NY, 1992.
  2. ibid, pp. 164 - 166.
  3. ibid, pp. 176 - 180.
  4. ibid, p. 93.
  5. ibid, pp. 164, 165.
  6. ibid, p. 180.
  7. ibid, p. 42.
  8. ibid, pp. 23- 27.
  9. ibid, pp. 31-34.
  10. Catania, A. Charles. (1999) ThorndikeÕs Legacy: Learning, Selection, and the Law of Effect.  Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 72, p. 427 (Referenced from http://psych.unn.ac.uk/pdf/thorndike.pdf)
  1. Petroski, op. cit., p. 179.
  2. ibid, p. 179.
  3. ibid, p. 179-180.
  4. ibid, p. 180.
  5. Private conversations with a civil engineering student at Cal Poly, John Q. Smith, in December of 2004 at the student center.
  6. ASCE-ACI Committee 445 on Shear and Torsion. (1998) Recent Approaches to Shear Design of Structural Concrete.  Journal of Structural Engineering, 124(12), p.1374