

Software as Product: The Technical Challenge to Social Notions of Responsibility

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The Big Picture

Engineering and social notions of defectiveness and responsibility are challenged by the unique nature of the software product!

The law *will* be applied to software

- technical explication necessary
 - software won't “fit” because of its *essential* nature!

Roadmap

- Legal background - legal risk management
 - defect classifications
- Hypothesis - software defect classification
- Software - nature of code defects
- No rational way to classify code defects
- Solution by software engineering progress?
- Conclusions

Terminology

- *Design* - intention or “plan” for a product
- *Safety-critical* - capable of causing or contributing to personal injury (or property damage).
- *Software* - nontrivial, safety-critical, mass marketed
- *Specifications* - requirements, design
- *Design specifications* - same as above
- *Specification sufficiency* - ability of specifications to contain all intentional decisions for code construction
- *Product* - artifact with dangerous potential sold on mass market (contrast with service)

Innovation by Design

- *Homo Faber*: Man, the maker
 - design projects from the known into unknown, possible worlds
 - promise and optimism about benefits to humans
- New artifacts alter arrays of potentialities
 - inevitable social *costs* in new risks
 - ***someone always pays the inevitable costs!***
 - *who* pays has consequences in the market

Social Progress

- Social desire for safety and predictability
 - conflicts with free technical innovation
- Social desire for technical innovation
 - conflicts with safety and predictability
- Society protects / advances its own welfare
 - one way: social notions of responsibility in tort
 - balance risks and benefits of innovative technology
 - common law goal is to optimize social welfare

Tort Law

- Social obligations orthogonal to contract
 - common, “judge made” law
 - dynamic, self correcting
 - requires deterministic algorithm that halts
- Purpose: allocate costs of technical progress
 - *sacrifice victim’s interests*
 - where social progress depends on technical progress
 - *industry “pays its way”*
 - where social goals are not advanced

Tort Law Meets Risky Artifacts of Design

- “Products” - potentially dangerous artifacts sold to *remote customers*
 - must involve personal injury (or prop damage)
 - inapplicable to pure “services” (malpractice)
- General Rule of Products Liability in Tort:
“One ... who sells ... a defective product is subject to liability for harm ... caused by the defect.” [Res99]

Defect Classification [Res99]

1. Defect in “Manufacture”

- if product “departs from intended design”
 - internal, technical standard: descriptive (correctness!)
 - risky “mistakes” are not socially beneficial
 - strict standard - “due care” irrelevant


2. Defect in “Design”

- if design safety is not (socially) defensible
 - external, social standard: normative
 - risky “intention” may bring social benefit
 - negligence standard - “due care” is central

CAUSE

FAULT

LIABILITY



Distinguishing Defect Class

- Find design intention (engineering question)
 - establishes legal standard: is due care relevant?
 - expected costs to parties can be determined
 - this is a BIG deal
 - who worries about this?
 - legal techniques:
 1. compare to “design specifications”
 2. “deviation from the norm” test
 - independent of designer’s specifications!

Enter Software Products

- Innovative artifacts present new risks
 - increasingly used in avionics, nuclear, medical
 - example: Therac-25 medical linac [LT93]
 - 6 massively overdosed
 - no technical solution expected [Lev95]
- No legal precedent yet, but software *will* soon face a products' suit
 - software considered a “product”
 - **disclaimers ineffective!**

My (common) Hypothesis

- Rational classification of code defects by “stage of production” analogy:
 - software design \Rightarrow design intention
 - software code \Rightarrow product construction
 - hypothesize a different analogy?
- Question: can software engineers rationally identify the class of arbitrary code flaws?
 - The answer is NO! (I had to write my Ph.D. work up as a failure.)

Related Work

- Legal research is divided
 - code as design [Wol93]
 - coding mistake as manufacturing defect [BD81]
 - difficulty in software defect classification footnoted
- Software research appears divided
 - [Ham92] and others call code “design”
 - [Bro95] says code “construction” of product
 - note concern with satisfaction of specifications

Overview of Argument

- Code construction issues
- Defects of each class exist in code
 - can we identify the class of an arbitrary defect?
 - operationalize social risk management by tort law
- Extant tests fail to distinguish rationally
 - research seems to offer partial solutions
 - but are they solutions to the right problem?
- Difficulty is *essential*, not accidental

Reality and Code Construction

- One product built and copied identically
 - code and fix
 - waterfall model: discrete stages of production
- Inevitable intertwining [SB82]
 - specifications not self contained
 - pressure on coders to deliver working code
 - code *inevitably contains design* decisions
- Spiral model [Boe88]

Defects in Software Products

- Code has potential for either kind of defect:
 - *manufacture*: failure to satisfy design intention
 - “ $x := y * 5$ ” instead of intended “ $x := y + 5$ ”
 - *design* : intention expressed [only] in code
 - clear whenever specification is insufficient
- Where is “design intention” for code?
 - objective: specifications
 - subjective: coder’s mind

Apply Current Tests to Distinguish Defect Class

1. *Deviation from the norm* test
 - **fails**: no deviations at all!
 - *NEW CLASS* - “generic manufacturing defects”
2. Comparison to *specifications*:
 - **fails**: specification insufficiency
 - might “work” for many flaws
 - won’t work for arbitrary flaws
 - specification completeness, consistency and correctness?

Example from Therac code

```
var := 0;
```

```
while (activity) do
```

```
    var := var + 1;
```

```
endwhile;
```

It Won't Work

- Specification insufficiency not new [Pet92]
 - “generic manufacturing defects” *are* new
 - *but we must* focus on specifications
- Better software tools and methods to *satisfice*?
 - is software engineering fundamentally a process of “experimentation?”

Software Engineering Progress

- Software research makes progress
 - progress in specification sufficiency:
 - post hoc rationalization [Par86]
 - design standards [Gamma]
 - formal specifications [Fisher]
- Progress is helpful, but for *this* problem?

Essential Problems with the Specification Approach

- Software unique among risky products:
 - medium of design = medium of implementation
 - *requires* that coders be skilled in manipulation of a design medium.
 - *enables* coders to make major design decisions
 - the medium is not constrained like for automobiles
 - “easter eggs”
 - recall *pressure* on coders!

Automobiles

Software

Medium of
Design

Descriptive

Descriptive

Medium of
Implementation


Physical

Descriptive

Is *Any* Distinction Rational?

- Software specification sufficiency a mirage?
 - fix code, then vary level of specification detail
 - range: overgeneral to overspecified
 - note effect on tests to specifications
 - what is the “ideal” level of detail?
 - notice the strange incentive structure set up!
 - code / specification distinctions are subjective
 - inadequate to apply important social objectives through the classification of software defects

pgms satisfying



Conclusions

- Software *will* face products liability law
- Courts *must* classify defects
 - the *only* standards *subjective* relative to code!
 - due to the essential nature of the software product
- Rational classification not possible
 - with current social/engineering notion of defect

Implied Conclusion

- Software engineering is inherently risky: it is a process of *experimentation*
 - we eventually find out what states the system might take that involve injury

Social Experimentation [MS89]

- Hypothesis: safe for intended purposes
- Population: users, passengers, patients, etc.
- Levels of experimentation
 - *lab*: counterexamples “fixed”
 - high control, low generalizability
 - *field*: possible lesson for state of the art [Pet85]
 - low control, high generalizability
- We experiment to make progress

Software “Manufacturing” (Implementation?) Defect

- Hypothesis: *This programming product* offers the level of safety I designed into it
 - Liability if my product *fails to meet my own [internal] design standards* involving safety
 - no likely social benefits to random experimentation, no consent
 - simple to prove a case, not much to it?
 - we defeated our own purpose as engineers?
 - standard of judgement is *internal, technical*

Software Design Defect

- Hypothesis: *This design* offers a reasonable level of safety
 - No liability - hypothesis proved true, consent based on *social need for the info*
 - Lots of information developed during the case
 - though consider settlements that allow sealing of records (private interests ahead of public interests?)
 - Liability - hypothesis false, no consent, no social need for this information
 - Standard of judgment is *external, social*

Defects in Instructions and Warnings

- Hypothesis: My product includes adequate information about residual design risks to render it reasonably safe for consumers
 - No liability - hypothesis proved, consent given
 - Liability - hypothesis disproved, no consent
 - Standard of judgment is *external, social*

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