

CPE/CSC 580: Intelligent Agents

Franz J. Kurfess

***Computer Science Department
California Polytechnic State University
San Luis Obispo, CA, U.S.A.***

Course Overview

❖ Introduction

- ❖ Intelligent Agent, Multi-Agent Systems
- ❖ Agent Examples

❖ Agent Architectures

- ❖ Agent Hierarchy, Agent Design Principles

❖ Reasoning Agents

- ❖ Knowledge, Reasoning, Planning

❖ Learning Agents

- ❖ Observation, Analysis, Performance Improvement

❖ Multi-Agent Interactions

- ❖ Agent Encounters, Resource Sharing, Agreements

❖ Communication

- ❖ Speech Acts, Agent Communication Languages

❖ Collaboration

- ❖ Distributed Problem Solving, Task and Result Sharing

❖ Agent Applications

- ❖ Information Gathering, Workflow, Human Interaction, E-Commerce, Embodied Agents, Virtual Environments

❖ Conclusions and Outlook

Overview Agent Architectures

- ❖ Motivation
- ❖ Objectives
- ❖ Agent Design Principles
- ❖ Agent Hierarchy
- ❖ Intentional Systems
- ❖ Abstract Agent Architecture
- ❖ Reactive Agents
- ❖ Important Concepts and Terms
- ❖ Chapter Summary

Motivation


Objectives

Agent Design Principles

Autonomy
Embodiment
Belief, Desire, Intent
Social Behavior

Autonomous Agent

- *An agent is*
 - a computer system that is
 - capable of independent action on behalf of its user or owner



Embodiment and Situatedness

- ❖ **An *embodied* agent has a physical manifestation**
 - ❖ often also called a robot
 - ❖ software agents typically are not embodied
- ❖ **Agents are situated in an environment**
 - ❖ often also referred to as context

Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI)

- ❖ software model developed for the design and programming of intelligent agents
- ❖ implements the principal aspects of Michael Bratman's theory of human practical reasoning
- ❖

Beliefs

- ❖ **represent the informational state of the agent**
 - ❖ beliefs about the world (including itself and other agents)
- ❖ **beliefs can include inference rules**
 - ❖ for the generation of new beliefs
- ❖ **the term belief is used instead of knowledge**
 - ❖ expresses the subjective nature
 - ❖ may change over time

Desires

- ❖ **represent the motivational state of the agent**
 - ❖ situations that the agent would like to achieve
- ❖ **goals are desires adopted for active pursuit**
 - ❖ sets of multiple goals should be consistent
 - ❖ sets of desires can be inconsistent

Intentions

- ❖ **represent the deliberative state of the agent**
 - ❖ the agent has chosen to do something
- ❖ **intentions are desires to which the agent has committed**
 - ❖ to some extent
- ❖ **a plan is a sequences of actions to achieve an intention**
- ❖ **an event is a trigger for reactive activity by an agent**

Social Ability

- The real world is a *multi*-agent environment: we cannot go around attempting to achieve goals without taking others into account
- Some goals can only be achieved with the cooperation of others
- Similarly for many computer environments: witness the Internet
- *Social ability* in agents is the ability to interact with other agents (and possibly humans) via some kind of *agent-communication language*, and perhaps cooperate with others

Agent Hierarchy

Reflex Agent


Model-Based Agent

Goal/Utility-Based Agent


Learning Agent

Reasoning Agent


Reflex Agent Diagram 2




Model-Based Reflex Agent Diagram



Utility-Based Agent Diagram



Learning Agent Diagram



Intentional Systems

Agents as Intentional Systems
The Need for Abstraction
Representational Flexibility
Post-Declarative Systems

Agents as Intentional Systems

- When explaining human activity, it is often useful to make statements such as the following:
 - Janine took her umbrella because she *believed* it was going to rain.
 - Michael worked hard because he *wanted* to possess a PhD.
- Human behavior is predicted and explained through the attribution of attitudes,
 - such as believing and wanting, hoping, fearing, ...
- The attitudes employed in such folk psychological descriptions are called the intentional notions

Agents as Intentional Systems

- The philosopher Daniel Dennett coined the term intentional system
 - describes entities 'whose behavior can be predicted by the method of attributing belief, desires and rational acumen'
- different 'grades' of intentional systems:
 - first-order intentional system has beliefs and desires but no beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires.
 - second-order intentional system is more sophisticated;
 - it has beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires
 - also has other intentional states
 - together with beliefs and desires about those other intentional states
 - refers to states of others and its own

Agents as Intentional Systems

- The answer seems to be that while the intentional stance description is consistent,
 - . . . it does not *buy us anything*, since we essentially understand the mechanism sufficiently to have a simpler, mechanistic description of its behavior.
(Yoav Shoham)
- Put crudely, the more we know about a system, the less we need to rely on animistic, intentional explanations of its behavior
- But with very complex systems, a mechanistic, explanation of its behavior may not be practicable
- *As computer systems become ever more complex, we need more powerful abstractions and metaphors to explain their operation — low level explanations become impractical. The intentional stance is such an abstraction*

Intentional Systems as Abstraction

- the more we know about a system, the less we need to rely on animistic, intentional explanations of its behavior
- with very complex systems, a mechanistic, explanation of its behavior may not be practicable
- intentions can be used to describe complex systems at a higher level of abstraction
 - to express aspects like
 - autonomy
 - goals
 - self-preservation
 - social behavior

Agents as Intentional Systems

- additional points in favor of this idea:
 - Characterizing Agents:
 - provides a familiar, non-technical way of *understanding & explaining* agents
 - Nested Representations:
 - offers the potential to specify systems that *include representations of other systems*
 - widely accepted that such nested representations are essential for agents that must cooperate with other agents

Post-Declarative Systems

- this view of agents leads to a kind of post-declarative programming:
 - In procedural programming, we say exactly what a system should do
 - In declarative programming, we state something that we want to achieve
 - give the system general info about the relationships between objects,
 - let a built-in control mechanism figure out what to do
 - e.g., goal-directed theorem proving
- intentional agents
 - very abstract specification of the system
 - let the control mechanism figure out what to do
 - knowing that it will act in accordance with some built-in theory of agency

Abstract Agent Architecture

Environment, States
Actions, Runs
State Transformations
Agent as Function
System

Abstract Architecture for Agents

- Assume the environment may be in any of a finite set E of discrete, instantaneous states:

$$E = \{e, e', \dots\}.$$

- Agents are assumed to have a repertoire of possible actions available to them, which transform the state of the environment:

$$Ac = \{\alpha, \alpha', \dots\}$$

- A *run*, r , of an agent in an environment is a sequence of interleaved environment states and actions:

$$r : e_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} e_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} e_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} e_3 \xrightarrow{\alpha_3} \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_{u-1}} e_u$$

Abstract Architecture for Agents

- Let:
 - R be the set of all such possible finite sequences (over E and Ac)
 - R^{Ac} be the subset of these that end with an action
 - R^E be the subset of these that end with an environment state

State Transformer Functions

- A *state transformer* function represents behavior of the environment:

$$\tau : \mathcal{R}^{Ac} \rightarrow \wp(E)$$

- Note that environments are...

- *history dependent*
- *non-deterministic*

- If $\tau(r) = \emptyset$, then there are no possible successor states to r . In this case, we say that the system has *ended* its run
- Formally, we say an environment Env is a triple $Env = \langle E, e_0, \tau \rangle$ where: E is a set of environment states, $e_0 \in E$ is the initial state, and τ is a state transformer function

Agents

- Agent is a function which maps runs to actions:

$$Ag : \mathcal{R}^E \rightarrow Ac$$

An agent makes a decision about what action to perform based on the history of the system that it has witnessed to date. Let AG be the set of all agents

Systems

Franz J. Kurfess

*Computer Science Department
California Polytechnic State University
San Luis Obispo, CA, U.S.A.*

Systems

$(e_0, \alpha_0, e_1, \alpha_1, e_2, \dots)$

Franz J. Kurfess

Cal
Calif
s


$e_u \in \tau((e_0, \alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_{u-1}))$ where
 $\alpha_u = Ag((e_0, \alpha_0, \dots, e_u))$

Reactive Agents

Perception
Agents with State
Tasks
Utility Functions

Perception

- Now introduce *perception* system:



Perception

- the *see* function is the agent's ability to observe its environment,
- the *action* function represents the agent's decision making process

- *Output* of the *see* function is a *percept*:

$$see : E \rightarrow Per$$

- maps environment states to percepts


- *action* is now a function

$$action : Per^* \rightarrow A$$

- maps sequences of percepts to actions

Agents with State

- We now consider agents that *maintain state*:



Agents with State

- internal data structure
 - typically used to record information about the environment state and history.
- let I be the set of all internal states of the agent
- the perception function see for a state-based agent is unchanged:

$$see : E \rightarrow Per$$

- the action-selection function $action$ is now defined as a mapping from internal states to actions:

$$action : I \rightarrow Ac$$

- An additional function $next$ is introduced:

$$next : I \times Per \rightarrow I$$

- maps an internal state and percept to an internal state

Agent Control Loop

1. Agent starts in some initial internal state i_0
2. Observes its environment state e , and generates a percept $see(e)$
3. Internal state of the agent is then updated via $next$ function, becoming $next(i_0, see(e))$
4. The action selected by the agent is $action(next(i_0, see(e)))$
5. Goto 2

Tasks for Agents

- agents carry out *tasks* for users
 - tasks must be *specified* by users
- tell agents what to do *without* telling them how to do it

Utility Functions over States

- associate *utilities* with individual states
 - the task of the agent is then to bring about states that maximize utility
- a task specification is a function

$$u : E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

- associates a real number with every environment state

Utility Functions over States

- value of a *run*
 - minimum utility of state on run?
 - maximum utility of state on run?
 - sum of utilities of states on run?
 - average?
- disadvantage:
 - difficult to specify a *long term* view when assigning utilities to individual states
one possibility: a *discount* for states later on

Utilities over Runs

- another possibility

- assigns a utility not to individual states, but to runs themselves:

$$u : R \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$$

- inherently *long term* view

- other variations

- incorporate probabilities of different states emerging

- difficulties with utility-based approaches:

- where do the numbers come from?
- humans don't think in terms of utilities
- hard to formulate tasks in these terms

Summary Agent Architectures

Important Concepts and Terms

- ❖ agent
- ❖ agent society
- ❖ architecture
- ❖ deduction
- ❖ environment
- ❖ hybrid architecture
- ❖ intelligence
- ❖ intention
- ❖ multi-agent system
- ❖ reactivity
- ❖ subsumption
- ❖